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REFORMING THE NCAA DRUG-TESTING PROGRAM
TO WITHSTAND STATE CONSTITUTIONAL SCRUTINY:
AN ANALYSIS AND PROPOSAL
Thomas P. Simon*
Three weeks before the University of Southern California
(USC) football team faced Michigan State in the 1988 Rose
Bowl, the National Collegiate Athletic Association' (NCAA)
tested the USC players in accordance with the drug-testing
program it had enacted in 1986.2 The players knew when
NCAA testing would occur and all of them passed, but USC
head coach Larry Smith was curious to see if the testing was
accurate.3 About three days before the game he ordered a
second test, this time unannounced, and several players tested
positive for banned substances even though none had failed
the NCAA's earlier test.4
This incident arising from the 1988 Rose Bowl was one of
many reports that student-athletes were using drugs5 and
avoiding detection under the NCAA's original program, which
randomly tested only those "student-athletes who compete in
NCAA championships and certified postseason football con-
tests. " 6 The incidence of student-athletes who tested positive
under that program had never exceeded one percent during its
* Contributing Editor, University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform, Volume 23,
1990. B.A., University of Virginia, 1987; J.D., University of Michigan Law School,
1990.
1. The NCAA "regulates men's and women's intercollegiate athletics at [member]
schools, conducts championships in all the sports it regulates, and sanctions some
two-dozen post-season football 'bowl games.' " Scanlan, Playing the Drug-Testing
Game: College Athletes, Regulatory Institutions, and the Structures of Constitutional
Argument, 62 IND. L.J. 863, 882 (1987). The NCAA consists of approximately one
thousand colleges and universities, of which approximately one half are public
institutions. See Arlosoroffv. NCAA, 746 F.2d 1019, 1020 (4th Cir. 1984) (describing
the NCAA). It also "promulgates rules to insure minimum standards for scholarship,
sportsmanship and amateurism." Id.
2. See B. SCHEMBECHLER & M. ALBOM, Bo 248 (1989). For a brief description
of the events leading to the 1986 adoption of the drug-testing program, see Hill v.
NCAA, 223 Cal. App. 3d 1642, 1657-58, 273 Cal. Rptr. 402, 411, appeal granted, 801
P.2d 1070, 276 Cal. Rptr. 319 (1990).
3. See B. SCHEMBECHLER & M. ALBOM, supra note 2, at 248.
4. Id.
5. See infra note 133 (listing reports).
6. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS'N, NCAA DRUG TESTING/EDUCATION
PROGRAMS 1989-90, at 6 (1989).
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first three years of implementation,7 but NCAA Executive
Director Richard Schultz stated that the low percentage
"sounds exciting, sounds great, like we've done a terrific job.
But unfortunately, I think we only catch the dumb [users]."'
To deter the use of steroids by "smart" users who avoid
detection because they know when testing will occur, NCAA
members voted overwhelmingly in January 1990 to expand the
program to include random, year-round testing of players in
major college-football programs for anabolic-steroid use.9
Malcolm McInnis, chairman of the drug-testing and drug-
education subcommittee of the NCAA Committee on Competi-
tive Safeguards and Medical Aspects of Sports, stated:
As individuals become more sophisticated in methods to
avoid detection, telling them a year in advance that
they're going to be tested before a bowl game is not a
deterrent at all. But if they know that they can be
tested at any time of year-particularly during train-
ing-that can be a very effective deterrent.1"
Shortly after year-round testing went into effect, the
California Court of Appeal held that the NCAA's original drug-
testing program violated a student-athlete's right of privacy as
protected by the California Constitution.1' This Note exam-
ines the impact of that decision and attempts to design a
program that will withstand state constitutional scrutiny.
7. In the academic year 1986-87, the NCAA declared ineligible 34 of the 3,360
athletes it tested (1.0 %). Krupa, Fighting a Losing Battle: The NCAA's Drug Testing
Plan is Floundering, SPORTS INC., Oct. 3, 1988, at 36. In 1987-88, 31 of the 3,304
athletes tested (0.9 %) were declared ineligible. Id. At NCAA championships and
before postseason bowl games in the fall of the 1988-89 academic year, only 11 of the
1,618 athletes tested (0.8 %) were declared ineligible. Fall Drug Tests Show 0.8 Rate
for Positives, NCAA NEWS, May 24, 1989, at 1, col. 5.
8. Schultz Advocates Random Drug Tests for Athletes, NCAA NEWS, Oct. 9, 1989,
at 4, col. 3.
9. See Rhoden, N.C.A.A. Stiffens Drug Penalties and Expands Testing in
Football, N.Y. Times, Jan. 11, 1990, at Al, col. 1.
10. Committee Proposes Year-Round Testing for Steroids, NCAA NEWS, July 5,
1989, at 1, col. 3. As Executive Director Richard Schultz stated:
There is so much sophistication, so many gurus out there that are trying to
stay one step ahead of the testing techniques, that if a person wants to take
anabolic steroids today, they [sic] can cycle those if they know they are going
to be tested and probably pass that test.
Schultz Advocates Random Drug Tests for Athletes, supra note 8, at 4, col. 3.
11. Hill v. NCAA, 223 Cal. App. 3d 1642, 273 Cal. Rptr. 402, appeal granted, 801
P.2d 1070, 276 Cal. Rptr. 319 (1990).
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NCAA Drug Testing
Part I describes the current NCAA drug-testing program. Part
II looks at the fourth amendment argument against drug
testing of student-athletes. Part III assesses the viability of
a federal constitutional attack on NCAA testing, while Part IV
discusses a state constitutional challenge. Finally, Part V
proposes reform of the current NCAA drug-testing program to
achieve its goals within the bounds of federal and state
constitutional rights of privacy.
I. THE NCAA DRUG-TESTING PROGRAM
A. The Original Program
In December 1986, All-American linebacker Brian Bosworth
of the University of Oklahoma tested positive for an anabolic
steroid called Deca Durabolin. 2 Barred by the NCAA from
playing in the Sooners' January 1, 1987, Orange Bowl game
against Arkansas, 3 Bosworth, the most publicized victim of
NCAA drug testing, added to his publicity by showing up at the
Orange Bowl sporting a t-shirt that read "NCAA: NATIONAL
COMMUNISTS AGAINST ATHLETES."
14
Brian Bosworth was tested and penalized in accordance
with the NCAA's original drug-testing program, which tested
only student-athletes who competed in NCAA championships
and postseason football bowl games. 5 The NCAA imple-
mented its program "[s]o that no one participant might have
an artificially induced advantage, so that no one participant
might be pressured to use chemical substances in order to
remain competitive, and to safeguard the health and safety of
participants." 6
Each year student-athletes must sign a statement consent-
ing to be tested for prohibited substances;'7 those who do not
12. See Neff, Bosworth Faces the Music, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Jan. 5, 1987, at 20-
21.
13. Id. By January 1987, 32 NCAA football players had been declared ineligible
for their teams' postseason bowl games after testing positive for banned substances.
See Brock & McKenna, Drug Testing in Sports, 92 DICK. L. REV. 505, 533 (1988).
14. For an interesting description of these events, see B. BOSWORTH WITH R.
REILLY, THE Boz: CONFESSIONS OF A MODERN ANTI-HERO 191-205 (Charter ed. 1989).
15. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
16. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS'N, supra note 6, at 6.
17. Id. at 6, 8-9 (NCAA bylaw 14.1.3.1).
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are ineligible.'" The NCAA states that its list of prohibited
substances "consists of substances generally purported to be
performance enhancing and/or potentially harmful to the
health and safety of the student-athlete." 9 The list includes
stimulants (e.g., amphetamines), anabolic steroids, diuretics,
and street drugs (e.g., marijuana).2 ° The program permits
use without penalty of a limited number of prescription and
over-the-counter medicines included in the list, but only if the
athlete can establish "a documented medical history demon-
strating the need for regular use of such a drug."
2'
The NCAA implements its program by sending testing
teams to college campuses and competition sites to collect
urine samples from selected athletes. 22  Athletes may be
selected for testing based on position of finish in the competi-
tion, playing time, playing position, suspicion, or NCAA-
approved random selection.23 The NCAA treats those who
refuse to provide urine, fail to appear when scheduled for
testing, or alter the validity of their specimen as if they had
tested positive for a banned substance.24
Testing officials visually monitor the furnishing of speci-
mens and divide them into two subsamples, each of which is
labeled with an identification number to establish a chain of
custody for subsequent administrative or legal action.25 The
first subsample is subjected to an assay.26 If it tests positive
for a banned substance, the second subsample is tested by gas
chromatography/mass spectrometry, 27 a more accurate but
considerably more expensive procedure. 21 If that test con-
firms the positive result, the NCAA informs the athlete's
institution that the athlete is in violation of NCAA rules and
is subject to the drug-testing plan's ineligibility sanctions.29
18. Id. at 12 (protocol 3.1).
19. Id. at 6.
20. Id. at 10 (NCAA bylaw 31.2.3.1).
21. Id. at 7 (NCAA bylaw 31.2.3.2).
22. See Scanlan, supra note 1, at 883.
23. See NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS'N, supra note 6, at 12 (protocols 4.2
and 4.3).
24. Id. at 12 (protocol 3.3).
25. See Scanlan, supra note 1, at 884.
26. Id. For a description of the immunoassay technique, see Miike & Hewitt,
Accuracy and Reliability of Urine Drug Tests, 36 U. KAN. L. REV. 641, 644-46 (1988).
27. See Scanlan, supra note 1, at 884.
28. For details on gas chromatography and mass spectrometry, see Miike &
Hewitt, supra note 26, at 646-47.
29. See Scanlan, supra note 1, at 884.
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The original program provided two levels of penalties: a
first positive test resulted in the student-athlete's loss of
eligibility for postseason competition for a minimum of ninety
days,3" and a subsequent positive test resulted in loss of
postseason eligibility in all sports for one season and ineligibil-
ity for postseason competition at least through the succeeding
academic year. 3' The institution may appeal the penalty if
it concludes that circumstances warrant restoring the student-
athlete's eligibility.32
B. The 1990 Reforms
At the NCAA's 84th annual convention in January 1990,
NCAA members voted overwhelmingly to require random,
year-round drug testing of Division I football players for
anabolic steroids and diuretics.33 Year-round testing supple-
ments the NCAA's original drug-testing program, which tested
only those student-athletes who participated in NCAA
championships or in certified football bowl games.34
The NCAA tests three dozen football players from each of
the 192 colleges and universities with Division I-A and I-AA
football teams.35 Testing occurs at least once and usually
twice a year, and its estimated cost is $1.6 million. 36 Select-
ed at random, the players receive between twenty-four and
forty-eight hours' notice that testing will occur.3"
The NCAA will limit the new program during the first two
years of its implementation to testing Division I football
players .38 On its face, though, the bylaw passed at the 84th
convention does not limit year-round testing to football, 39 and
30. See id.
31. See NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS'N, supra note 6, at 6 (NCAA bylaw
18.4.1.5.1).
32. Id. at 6 (NCAA bylaw 18.4.1.5).
33. See Rhoden, supra note 9, at Al, col. 1. Year-round testing replaced
regulations implemented in 1989 that permitted the NCAA to test football players
for anabolic steroids on a voluntary basis. See NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC
ASS'N, supra note 6, at 15-16.
34. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.




39. See NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS'N, supra note 6, at 6 (NCAA bylaw
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an NCAA official stated that year-round testing will be
expanded to other sports if it proves effective. 40 For the time
being, student-athletes in sports other than Division I football
are tested only before they participate in NCAA champion-
ships.4 '
NCAA members also voted at the 84th convention to impose
stiffer penalties on all violators of the NCAA's drug policies. 2
The tougher penalties affect student-athletes who test positive
for a banned substance under either the original program or
the year-round testing program. 43 A first positive test results
in the loss of one year of eligibility.44 A second positive test
for street drugs brings the loss of another year's eligibility,
while a second positive test for a performance-enhancing drug,
e.g., an anabolic steroid, results in a lifetime ban from NCAA
athletics.45 If a member institution knowingly allows an
ineligible athlete to participate in a competition, the school
must forfeit any awards or net receipts it may have earned,
and the team's and athlete's performances are stricken from
NCAA records.46
II. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND URINALYSIS TESTING
OF STUDENT-ATHLETES
The most serious challenge to drug testing of student-
athletes arises from the right of privacy protected by the
fourth amendment and its state constitutional equivalents.4 v
18.4.1.5.2).
40. See Rhoden, supra note 9, at Al, col. 1.
41. Id. at Al, col. 2.
42. Id. at Al, col. 1.
43. Id.
44. Id. at Al, col. 2.
45. Id.
46. Id. at B13, col. 1.
47. See, e.g., Cochran, Drug Testing of Athletes and the United States Constitu-
tion: Crisis and Conflict, 92 DICK. L. REV. 571, 576-82 (1988); Lock & Jennings, The
Constitutionality of Mandatory Student-Athlete Drug Testing Programs: The Bounds
of Privacy, 38 U. FLA. L. REV. 581, 588-608 (1986); Rose & Girard, Drug Testing in
Professional and College Sports, 36 U. KAN. L. REV. 787, 814-17 (1988); Scanlan,
supra note 1, at 915-42; Comment, The NCAA Declares War: Student-Athletes Battle
the Mandatory Drug Test, 16 CAP. U.L. REV. 673, 694-96 (1987) (authored by Robert
J. Meredith); Note, Does the National Collegiate Athletic Association's Drug Testing
Program Test Positive if it is Subjected to Constitutional Scrutiny?, 37 DRAKE L. REV.
83, 90-98 (1987) (authored by Joseph V. Fonti); Note, The National Collegiate Athletic
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The fourth amendment 48 generally requires a governmental
search to be based on "probable cause."49 The United States
Supreme Court has held that drug testing by means of
urinalysis is a search.5 ° The recent trend, however, is to-
wards the conclusion that probable cause is unnecessary if a
search meets the more general standard of reasonableness
under all of the circumstances. 51
According to the Supreme Court's pronouncement in New
Jersey v. T.L.O. ,2 "[t]he determination of the standard of
reasonableness governing any specific class of searches
requires 'balancing the need to search against the invasion
which the search entails.' "" The Court described that
balancing process: "On one side of the balance are arrayed the
individual's legitimate expectations of privacy and personal
security; on the other, the government's need for effective
methods to deal with breaches of public order."54
Association, Random Drug-Testing, and the Applicability of the Administrative Search
Exception, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 641, 647-88 (1989) (authored by Craig H. Thaler);
Note, Is Innocence Forever Gone? Drug Testing High School Athletes, 54 Mo. L. REV.
425, 430-34 (1989) (authored by Mary L. Scott); Note, An Analysis of Public College
Athlete Drug Testing Programs Through the Unconstitutional Condition Doctrine and
the Fourth Amendment, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 815, 819-24, 836-50 (1987) (authored by
Sally Lynn Meloch). On drug testing students generally, see Note, School Drug Tests:
A Fourth Amendment Perspective, 1987 U. ILL. L. REV. 275 (1987) (authored by
Kathryn A. Buckner).
48. The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
49. The Supreme Court frequently grapples with the definition of "probable
cause." See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985) ("Ordinarily, a
search.., must be based upon 'probable cause' to believe that a violation of the law
has occurred."); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230-39 (1983); see also Y. KAMISAR,
W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CASES, COMMENTS,
QUESTIONS 173-98 (7th ed. 1990) (discussing cases); Comment, Shoemaker v. Handel
and Urinalysis Drug Testing: Looking for an American Standard, 21 GA. L. REV. 467,
471 (1986) (authored by Robert M. Keenan III); Note, School Drug Tests: A Fourth
Amendment Perspective, supra note 47, at 281-86.
50. See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 617 (1989).
51. See, e.g., Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1051 (1983); United States v.
Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983); see also Note, The Civil and Criminal Methodologies
of the Fourth Amendment, 93 YALE L.J. 1127 (1984) (authored by Ronald F. Wright);
Comment, supra note 49, at 471.
52. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
53. Id. at 337 (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 537 (1967)).
54. Id.; see also United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983) (stating that the
level of suspicion required before the government may conduct a search involves
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In the context of urinalysis drug testing, courts generally
recognize two basic infringements on privacy: (1) the funda-
mental deprivation of individual dignity and privacy that
results from performing a private bodily function in the
presence of a test administrator;55 and (2) the invasion of the
reasonable expectation of privacy regarding the information
contained in one's bodily fluids.56 Against those invasions of
privacy, courts will weigh the program's efficacy at achieving
its goals, which in the context of student-athlete testing
typically include protecting the health and safety of the
student-athletes and maintaining fair competition. 7
Currently, sixty percent of NCAA Division I institutions
test their student-athletes for drug use.58 The programs at
the University of Colorado and the University of Washington
have been challenged under the fourth amendment and state
constitutional equivalents. In Derdeyn v. University of
"balanc[ing] the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth
Amendment interests against the importance of the governmental interests alleged
to justify the intrusion").
55. See, e.g., Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602,617 (1989)
("Because it is clear that the collection and testing of urine intrudes upon expecta-
tions of privacy that society has long recognized as reasonable, the Federal Courts
of Appeals have concluded unanimously, and we agree, that these intrusions must be
deemed searches under the Fourth Amendment."); Schaill v. Tippecanoe County
School Corp., 864 F.2d 1309, 1312 (7th Cir. 1988) ("There can be little doubt that a
person engaging in the act of urination possesses a reasonable expectation of privacy
as to that act, and as to the urine which is excreted."); National Treasury Employees
Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170, 175-76 (5th Cir. 1987), affd in part and vacated in
part, 489 U.S. 656 (1989) ("There are few activities in our society more personal or
private than the passing of urine."); Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507,
1513 (D.N.J. 1986) ('Urine . . . is normally discharged and disposed of under
circumstances that merit protection from arbitrary interference.").
56. See, e.g., Schaill, 864 F.2d at 1312 ("The fact that urine is voluntarily
discharged from the body and treated as a waste product does not eliminate the
expectation of privacy which an individual possesses in his or her urine."); American
Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Weinberger, 651 F. Supp. 726, 735-36 (S.D. Ga. 1986).
57. For a description of the purposes of the NCAA's drug-testing program, see
NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS'N, supra note 6, at 6 and text accompanying
note 16.
58. See Antidrug Programs Level Off for Now, NCAA NEWS, Aug. 2, 1989, at 6,
col. 1. One hundred fifty-two Division I schools responded to the survey, which was
conducted by the NCAA Committee on Competitive Safeguards and Medical Aspects
of Sports. Id. The percentage is considerably lower at NCAA Division II and
Division III institutions. Id. For descriptions of various programs implemented by
Division I schools, see Rose & Girard, supra note 47, at 812-14 (Universities of
Washington, Colorado, and Kansas); Rovere, Haupt & Yates, Drug Testing in a
University Athletic Program: Protocol and Implementation, PHYSICIAN &
SPORTSMEDICINE, Apr. 1986, at 69 (Wake Forest University); Scanlan, supra note 1,
at 884-92 (Indiana University); and Comment, The NCAA Declares War, supra note
47, at 694-96 (Ohio State University).
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Colorado9 and O'Halloran v. University of Washington,6 °
state trial courts held that those programs did not advance
their stated goals sufficiently to justify the intrusions caused
by testing."1 In a third determination, the Oregon Attorney
General also concluded that the intrusiveness of a drug-testing
program would outweigh the University's interests in testing
when the Oregon Department of Higher Education requested
that he address the constitutionality of a proposed program at
the University of Oregon.62
"State action" must be present, however, before one can
invoke the fourth amendment's protection." That require-
ment was met in the decisions discussed above because state
universities are governmental entities, 4 but it poses an
obstacle to a federal constitutional challenge to NCAA drug-
testing because the NCAA, as an unincorporated voluntary
association, is not an obvious state actor.
III. FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES
TO NCAA DRUG TESTING
Brian Bosworth was not the only All-American football
player barred from postseason play during the first year of
NCAA testing. The NCAA likewise suspended All-American
defensive end Rolando Barbay of Louisiana State University
(LSU) after he had tested positive for an anabolic steroid,65
59. No. 86CV2245 (Colo. Dist. Ct., Boulder County, Aug. 22, 1989).
60. No. 87-2-08775-1 (Wash. Super. Ct., King County, July 23, 1987).
61. See Derdeyn, slip op. at 6-7; O'Halloran, transcript of oral op. at 10-11. In
O'Halloran, the trial court subsequently ordered the NCAA to be joined as a third-
party defendant. See Order Compelling Joinder, O'Halloran v. University of
Washington, No. 87-2-08775-1 (Wash. Super. Ct., King County, July 24, 1987).
Plaintiffs claim against the University of Washington was dismissed after reaching
a compromise with the university. See O' Halloran v. University of Washington, 679
F. Supp. 997, 998 (W.D. Wash. 1988) (stating the procedural history of the case).
Plaintiff persisted with her case against the NCAA after the NCAA removed the case
to federal court. Id.
62. See Op. Or. Att'y Gen. No. 8191 (Nov. 16, 1987).
63. See, e.g., Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982); see generally J.
NowAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 497-525 (2d ed. 1983)
(discussing "state action").
64. See, e.g., Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d 73, 82-83 (2d Cir. 1968); Morale v. Grigel,
422 F. Supp. 988, 996 (D.N.H. 1976); Smyth v. Lubbers, 398 F. Supp. 777, 783-84
(W.D. Mich. 1975).
65. See Neff, supra note 12, at 21.
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but Barbay did not make headlines by showing up at LSU's
1987 Sugar Bowl contest in a controversial t-shirt. Instead, he
protested the NCAA's action by filing a lawsuit in the federal
district court in New Orleans, claiming that his property right
in his reputation would be damaged if he were suspended from
the Sugar Bowl.66 Barbay's federal constitutional claim
against the NCAA failed, however, when the court dismissed
his case for lack of state action.67
The following year, a Florida trial court in Dade County
refused to grant an injunction sought by two University of
Miami football players whom the NCAA had suspended from
the Orange Bowl game after the players tested positive for
diuretics. 68 Again, the court held that there was "no govern-
ment question involved in the case."69
Another challenge under the United States Constitution
came in O'Halloran v. University of Washington.70 In that
case, plaintiff contended that the NCAA's drug-testing
program was flawed constitutionally because it interfered
significantly with the student-athletes' rights of privacy
protected by the fourth amendment. 71  The court granted
summary judgment to the defendant because plaintiff did not
demonstrate that the NCAA's drug-testing program was
enforced by persons acting under color of state law.72
Each of these federal constitutional challenges to the NCAA
drug-testing program failed because the plaintiff could not
demonstrate that the NCAA was a state actor. Before 1982,
courts typically held that the NCAA was a state actor.73
These early cases rested on the notion that indirect involve-
ment of state government could convert what otherwise would
be considered private conduct into state action. Courts
66. Barbay v. NCAA, No. 86-5697, 1987 U.S. Dist LEXIS 393, 1987 WL 5619
(E.D. La. Jan. 20, 1987).
67. Id.
68. See Mira, O'Neill Sidelined After Appeal is Rejected, Newsday, Jan. 2, 1988,
at 28.
69. Id.
70. 679 F. Supp. 997 (W.D. Wash.), rev'd on procedural grounds, 856 F.2d 1375
(9th Cir. 1988).
71. O'Halloran, 679 F. Supp. at 1000.
72. Id. at 1002.
73. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Minnesota v. NCAA, 560 F.2d 352, 364 (8th
Cir.), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 978 (1977); Howard Univ. v. NCAA, 510 F.2d 213, 216-
20 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Parish v. NCAA, 506 F.2d 1028, 1031-33 (5th Cir. 1975); Associ-
ated Students, Inc. of California State Univ. v. NCAA, 493 F.2d 1251, 1254-55 (9th
Cir. 1974).
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justified their decisions on grounds that the NCAA performs
a public function by regulating intercollegiate athletics,74
that there was substantial interdependence between the
NCAA and the state institutions that comprise about one-half
of its membership,75 and that the state institutional members
played a "substantial, although admittedly not pervasive, role"
in NCAA funding and decision making.76
In 1982, the Supreme Court narrowed the test for determin-
ing what conduct by a private party will constitute state
action.77 Since then, federal courts of appeals addressing the
issue have held that the NCAA is not a state actor.78 In
Arlosoroff v. NCAA,79 for example, promulgating a new
NCAA eligibility bylaw8° that precluded the top singles
player on the Duke tennis team from further competition in
intercollegiate tennis did not constitute state action. The
NCAA's regulation of intercollegiate athletics, which the court
acknowledged may be of some public service, did not justify
a finding of state action because that function was not
traditionally reserved to the state. 1 Moreover, the fact that
approximately one half of the NCAA's members were public
institutions that provided more than one half of its revenues
did not alter its basic character as a voluntary association of
public and private institutions.8 2 The court stated:
It is not enough that an institution is highly regulated
and subsidized by a state. If the state in its regulatory
or subsidizing function does not order or cause the action
74. See Parish, 506 F.2d at 1032-33.
75. See, e.g., Howard Univ., 510 F.2d at 219.
76. Parish, 506 F.2d at 1032; see also Howard Univ., 510 F.2d at 219-20.
77. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 936-39 (1982); Blum v.
Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004-05 (1982); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 837-38
(1982).
78. See McCormack v. NCAA, 845 F.2d 1338, 1346 (5th Cir. 1988); Karmanos v.
Baker, 816 F.2d 258, 260-61 (6th Cir. 1987); Graham v. NCAA, 804 F.2d 953, 957-58
(6th Cir. 1986); Arlosoroff v. NCAA, 746 F.2d 1019, 1021-22 (4th Cir. 1984).
79. 746 F.2d 1019 (4th Cir. 1984).
80. The bylaw provided that "any participation in organized competition in a
sport during each twelve month period after the student's 20th birthday and prior to
matriculation with a member institution should count as one year of varsity competi-
tion in that sport." Arlosoroff, 746 F.2d at 1020 (quoting NCAA bylaw 5.1.d.3). The
NCAA had ruled that plaintiffs freshman year was his final year of eligibility
because he had spent three years in organized tennis after his discharge from the
Israeli army and before his matriculation at Duke. Id.
81. Id. at 1021.
82. Id.
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complained of, and the function is not one traditionally
reserved to the state, there is no state action. 3
In Arlosoroff, there was no suggestion that the state institu-
tions had joined together as a bloc to adopt the challenged
bylaw over the objection of the private institutions. 4
The Supreme Court directly addressed whether the NCAA
is a state actor in NCAA v. Tarkanian.a5 In 1976, the NCAA
imposed a two-year suspension from televised and postseason
play on the University of Nevada, Las Vegas (UNLV) basket-
ball team after it found thirty-eight violations of NCAA rules,
ten of which involved Jerry Tarkanian, UNLV's well-known
basketball coach. 6 In addition, the NCAA essentially or-
dered UNLV to remove Tarkanian from its intercollegiate
athletic program during the probation period or face further
sanctions.17 When UNLV reluctantly complied, Tarkanian
siied the NCAA alleging deprivation of liberty and property
without due process. 8
To implicate the due process clause, Tarkanian argued that
the NCAA was a state actor because UNLV, unquestionably a
state actor, had delegated its own function to the NCAA when
it complied with NCAA rules and recommendations.8 9 Writ-
ing for the majority, Justice Stevens disagreed, concluding
that "[n]either UNLV's decision to adopt the NCAA's stan-
dards nor its minor role in their formulation" was sufficient to
transform promulgating those standards into state action.90
Without the requisite state action to invoke the Constitution's
protection, the Court held that the NCAA had not violated due
process when it investigated UNLV and recommended
disciplinary action against Tarkanian.9
Commentators have noted that Tarkanian's most signifi-
cant implication may be in the area of NCAA drug testing. 2
83. Id. at 1022.
84. Id.
85. 488 U.S. 179 (1988); see generally Note, The NCAA and State Action: The
Supreme Court Dunks Jerry Tarkanian, 40 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1123 (1989) (authored
by Ronald E. Friese).
86. Most of the violations concerned illegal recruiting practices, but the most
serious charge was that Tarkanian attempted to frustrate the NCAA's investigation
by getting people to "change their story." See Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 186 n.9.
87. See id. at 186.
88. Id. at 187.
89. Id. at 191-92.
90. Id. at 195.
91. Id. at 199.
92. See Hochberg, The True Meaning of "Tarkanian," SPORTS INC., Jan. 9, 1989,
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With the recent Supreme Court decision and a line of federal
appellate cases holding that adopting NCAA rules does not
constitute state action, the NCAA can be confident that its
current drug-testing program is shielded from attack under
the United States Constitution.
IV. A STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE
TO NCAA DRUG TESTING
Although insulated from attack under the federal Constitu-
tion, the NCAA drug-testing program remains susceptible to
challenge on state constitutional right-of-privacy grounds. The
California Constitution's protection of privacy rights,93 for
example, appears to be broader than the federal
Constitution's,94 and its guarantee of privacy is enforceable
against the NCAA because the federal prerequisite of state
action is not required.95 Several other states also read their
state constitutions' guarantee of privacy more expansively
than the federal Constitution's fourth amendment.96
In LeVant v. NCAA, 97 the captain of the Stanford Univer-
sity women's diving team challenged the NCAA's drug-testing
program under the privacy provision of the California Consti-
tution. The trial court issued a preliminary injunction
permitting plaintiff to compete without penalty even though
she had refused to sign the consent form required by the
at 44; Note, supra note 85, at 1138-40.
93. The California Constitution provides: "All people are by nature free and
independent and have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending
life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and
obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy." CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1 (1849, amended
1972) (emphasis added).
94. See City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson, 27 Cal. 3d 123, 131 n.3, 610 P.2d 436,
440 n.3, 164 Cal. Rptr. 539, 543 n.3 (1980) ("[T]he federal right of privacy.. . appears
to be narrower than what the voters approved ... when they added 'privacy' to the
California Constitution."); see generally Note, The NCAA Drug-Testing Program and
the California Constitution: Has California Expanded the Right of Privacy?, 23 U.S.F.
L. REV. 253, 255-65 (1989) (authored by Deborah Holmes McBride).
95. See Wilkinson v. Times Mirror Corp., 215 Cal. App. 3d 1034, 1041-43,264 Cal.
Rptr. 194, 198-200 (1989); Porten v. University of San Francisco, 64 Cal. App. 3d 825,
829, 134 Cal. Rptr. 839, 842 (1976).
96. See, e.g., People v. Beavers, 393 Mich. 554, 564-68, 227 N.W.2d 511, 514-16,
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 878 (1975) (discussing article I, § 11 of the Michigan
Constitution); State v. Myrick, 102 Wash. 2d 506, 510, 688 P.2d 151, 153 (1984)
(discussing article I, § 7 of the Washington Constitution).
97. No. 619209 (Cal. Super. Ct., Santa Clara County, Mar. 13, 1987).
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NCAA.9" The case became moot, however, when plaintiff, a
senior, failed to qualify for NCAA championships.99
To force the court to reach the issues raised in LeVant, a co-
captain of the Stanford women's soccer team and a starting
linebacker on the football team substituted as plaintiffs.0 °
In Hill v. NCAA,' °' a different state trial court held that the
NCAA drug-testing program violated the California Constitu-
tion and permanently enjoined the NCAA from enforcing its
program against Stanford student-athletes.0 2
The California 'Court of Appeal addressed the issue on the
NCAA's appeal.103 That court determined that the NCAA
must show a "compelling interest" in testing before it could
invade the student-athletes' fundamental privacy rights."
To do that, the NCAA would have to "demonstrate that: (1) the
testing program relates to the purposes of the NCAA regula-
tions which confer the benefit (participation in intercollegiate
competition); (2) the utility of imposing the program manifestly
outweighs any resulting impairment of the constitutional
right; and (3) there are no less offensive alternatives."0 5
The court of appeal affirmed the trial court's decision that the
program violated the right of privacy based on its finding that
the NCAA failed to demonstrate all three of those require-
ments.
The NCAA implied that the first prong of that test would
be satisfied if the evidence at trial supported the NCAA's
contention that its program promotes the health of student-
athletes and the integrity of competition by deterring the use
of banned substances. 10 6 The court observed, however, that
"[a]ll of the evidence taken together demonstrated that there
was no drug involvement in any sport except football, and that
the problem related only to steroid use and involved a small
minority of the football players." 107 This suggests that the
original NCAA program was overbroad to the extent that it
98. See id. (Order Granting Preliminary Injunction at 2).
99. See Incident or Precedent?, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Mar. 23, 1987, at 18.
100. See Note, supra note 94, at 270.
101. No. 619209 (Cal. Super. Ct., Santa Clara County, Aug. 10, 1988), affd, 223
Cal. App. 3d 1642, 273 Cal. Rptr. 402, appeal granted, 801 P.2d 1070, 276 Cal. Rptr.
319 (1990).
102. See Hill, transcript of oral op. at 25-27.
103. See Hill v. NCAA, 223 Cal. App. 3d 1642, 273 Cal. Rptr. 402, appeal granted,
801 P.2d 1070, 276 Cal. Rptr. 319 (1990).
104. Id. at 1656, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 410.
105. Id. at 1656-57, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 410.
106. See id. at 1657-58, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 411.
107. Id. at 1662, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 414.
NCAA Drug Testing
reached sports other than football and substances other than
steroids. Moreover, there was "no scientific evidence that drug
testing is an effective deterrent to drug use."
108
Moving to the second prong of its analysis, the court deter-
mined that the utility of the program did not manifestly
outweigh its impairment of the student-athletes' constitutional
right of privacy. °9 The court recognized that the program
caused several intrusions into privacy, including the invasion
caused by monitored urine collection 10 and the interference
with the student-athletes' rights to medical confidentiali-
ty, 1  to control their own medical treatment, 112 and to be
left alone.113
In the court's view, these intrusions outweighed the NCAA's
less-than-compelling interests in testing, which included
protecting the health and safety of student-athletes and
maintaining fair and equitable competition. The health and
safety goal was not compelling because evidence at trial
showed that drug use by student-athletes was no greater than
that of other students.1 4 Moreover, the court concluded that
the program actually might harm the health of student-
athletes because it might deter the use of over-the-counter and
prescription medications, many of which contain banned
substances.1 5 The court also noted that the program does
not provide counselling or rehabilitation, and "[i]dentifying
someone who has a drug problem does not help the health of
that person unless he receives appropriate treatment."" 6 As
for the fair and equitable competition goal, the court found
that the goal was not compelling because "the evidence did not
establish that any of the drugs on the banned list would
actually enhance the performance of an athlete in the NCAA
sports." 7
The court then found that the NCAA had not satisfied the
third prong because it had failed to show that there were no
less intrusive means available to further its health and fair-
108. Id. at 1672, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 420.
109. Id. at 1665-73, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 416-21.
110. Id. at 1666, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 416-17.
111. Id. at 1666-67, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 417.
112. Id. at 1667, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 417.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 1668, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 418.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1669, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 418.
117. Id.
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competition goals.118 The court focused on the NCAA's
failure to try drug education adequately, or to consider testing
based on reasonable suspicion as an alternative to random
testing." 9  Additionally, the court of appeal relied on the
trial court's finding that the NCAA's drug-testing program was
overbroad because it included substances that do not enhance
performance and for which there is no evidence of use in
college athletics. 2 °  Finally, the court noted that the
program's appeal process was inadequate.
121
The court's holding that the NCAA drug-testing program
violates the California Constitution is especially important
because California is home to a large number of colleges and
universities and is the site of many NCAA athletic competi-
tions, including the Rose Bowl game. 122 One example of the
consequences of the decision could be that Big Ten football
players will be tested before playing in the Rose Bowl al-
though Pac-10 players will not be tested. 123  The NCAA
concedes that it "cannot be expected to maintain a nationwide
system of interstate competition in which only some athletes
are subject to drug testing and possible disqualification while
others are not, any more than it could allow only some schools
to pay their athletes or exempt them from attending class-
es.""'24 Frank Uryasz, NCAA Director of Sports Sciences, has
stated: "I think there is a problem anytime there's testing in
49 of the states and not the 50th. There's certainly going to
be some inequity there. We can't operate that way."
125
V. A PROPOSAL TO REFORM
THE NCAA DRUG-TESTING PROGRAM
The NCAA must eliminate the original portion of its
current drug-testing program because a situation in which
that portion of testing is unenforceable in one state but
118. Id. at 1673-74, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 421.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1674, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 422.
121. Id. at 1674-75, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 422.
122. Scanlan, supra note 1, at 913.
123. See Krupa, supra note 7, at 37.
124. Hill, 223 Cal. App. 3d at 1675, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 422.
125. Krupa, supra note 7, at 37.
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enforceable in other states threatens the fair competition that
the program was designed to ensure.12 If the NCAA chooses
not to eliminate testing altogether, it must redesign its
program to withstand attack under all state constitutions.
The NCAA may have taken a step toward designing a program
that conforms with state constitutions when, in 1990, it
implemented unannounced, year-round testing of Division I
college football players for anabolic steroids.'27 This part of
the Note considers the constitutionality of that program under
the test set forth by the California Court of Appeal in Hill v.
NCAA.12
8
A. The Efficacy of Year-Round Testing
The NCAA first would have to show that Division I football
players use anabolic steroids. The court in Hill noted that
"[t]he trial court found it undisputed that athletes do not use
drugs any more than college students generally or others of
their age group,"1 29 but a court would be hard-pressed to
make a similar finding about the use of anabolic steroids. The
California Court of Appeal acknowledged that evidence of at
least some anabolic steroid use in football exists. 3 ° Existing
statistics almost certainly underreport the extent of steroid
use because football players knew when NCAA testing would
occur under the original program and cycled their steroid use
to avoid testing positive.
131
126. See supra text accompanying notes 124-25 (discussing the possibility of
different testing in different states); Hill, 223 Cal. App. 3d at 1657-58, 273 Cal. Rptr.
at 411 (mentioning the NCAA's concern for fair competition).
127. See supra text accompanying note 9.
128. See supra text accompanying notes 101-21.
129. Hill v. NCAA, 223 Cal. App. 3d 1642, 1660, 273 Cal. Rptr. 402, 413, appeal
granted, 801 P.2d 1070, 276 Cal. Rptr. 319 (1990).
130. See Hill, 223 Cal. App. 3d at 1661-62, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 413-14.
131. NCAA Assistant Director Frank Uryasz concurs:
I don't think you can rely on percent positive to reflect usage. The reason
we're testing is to deter use of anabolic steroids and other substances. The
figures reflect that we're deterring the use of oil-based and injectables [which
stay in the system longer]. I don't think they tell us anything about water-
based [which leave the system relatively quickly].
Myslenski, Pumping Drugs, Chicago Tribune, Jan. 22, 1989, § 10 (Magazine), at 16,
col. 2.
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The NCAA should be able to demonstrate the use of
steroids by college football players because this knowledge is
now fairly widespread. A 1989 survey found that the number
of college athletes using anabolic steroids is increasing.
13 2
Newspapers frequently report allegations of steroid use by
NCAA football players."' 3 If the proposed program were
implemented and subsequently challenged, the NCAA should
present witnesses such as Steve Huffman, a former University
of Notre Dame football player who alleged that steroids were
used widely by those in the Fighting Irish football pro-
gram.
3 4
The NCAA also would have to show that unannounced,
year-round testing for anabolic steroids would deter their use
effectively. The Hill court stated that "NCAA testing, which
is preannounced and takes place only at championships, would
only deter drug use among a very small number of people and
only for the immediate period of the drug testing."'35 Ath-
letes avoided detection under the original NCAA program
because they knew when testing would occur, 136 but the
unannounced nature of testing under the proposed program
would prevent athletes from preparing methods to avoid
detection.
132. See Goldberg, Study Reveals Steroid Use Up, Cocaine Down, Washington
Times, Oct. 17, 1989, at D2, col. 2. Of nearly 2,300 athletes surveyed by Michigan
State University researchers, five percent (mainly football players) reported using
anabolic steroids. Id.
133. See, e.g., Michigan St. Officials to Look into Alleged Steroid Use, Chicago
Tribune, Mar. 22, 1990, at C2 (Chicagoland North ed.) (reporting that after a two-
month study with more than 100 players, parents, police officers, and physicians, the
Detroit News stated that steroid use was widespread in recent years among Michigan
State University football players); Jauss, NU Getting Tougher on Drug Testing,
Chicago Tribune, Feb. 11, 1990, at C10, col. 1 (reporting that two former Northwest-
ern University football players stated that linemen on the 1986 and 1987 Northwest-
ern football teams used steroids, and that one estimated that "from 80 to 90 percent
of offensive and defensive linemen tried steroids at least once"); Berkowitz & Sell,
Former Terrapins Say They Knew of Steroid Use, Washington Post, May 3, 1989, at
C1, col. 6 (reporting that two former University of Maryland football players said
they were aware some of their teammates were using steroids, and that one
estimated that "20 to 25 percent" of them used steroids during the 1985-86 school
year).
134. See Huffman & Telander, I Deserve My Turn, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Aug. 27,
1990, at 26. Huffman states that almost half the lettermen at Notre Dame used
steroids at some time, and describes scenes of dozens of steroid bottles and hypoder-
mic needles littering dormitory rooms. Id. at 30.
135. Hill, 223 Cal. App. 3d at 1672, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 420.
136. See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
306
NCAA Drug Testing
The Hill court also observed that "[s]teroids are a drug
primarily used during training. If water-based steroids are
used, they cannot be detected in urine after a few weeks.
Testing for steroids at the time of postseason competition is
not likely to detect or deter such steroid use during train-
ing." 117 By testing year-round, the proposed program would
test athletes during off-season training periods when they are
most likely to use steroids. In fact, some suggest that year-
round, out-of-competition testing may be the only way to deter
the use of steroids.
138
B. Utility Versus Impairment
The NCAA also would have to show that the utility of the
proposed program would outweigh its intrusiveness.' 39  A
court applying the Hill test likely would find that the proposed
program is not nearly as intrusive as the NCAA's original
program. Because testing would be completely unannounced
under the proposed program, the NCAA could eliminate its
current requirement that the taking of samples be monitored
visually because athletes would not have the opportunity to
prepare a false sample.'4 ° The proposed program also would
interfere significantly less with the student-athletes' right to
control their own medical treatment by banning only the use
of anabolic steroids. Eventually, the NCAA may be able to
reduce the intrusiveness of testing even further by replacing
urinalysis with hair testing. The technology is currently
available to perform radio-immunoassay tests of hair samples
for illegal drug use, but the Food and Drug Administration has
stated that the tests are "unproven" and "unreliable" at this
time. 4 '
137. Hill, 223 Cal. App. 3d at 1672, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 420.
138. See, e.g., Cowert, Random Testing During Training May Be Only Way to
Combat Drugs in Sports, 260 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 3556 (1988).
139. See Hill, 223 Cal. App. 3d at 1665-73, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 416-21.
140. Even the NCAA's requirement that the taking of urine samples be visually
monitored does not completely eliminate the possibility of a false sample. Seven
Michigan State University football players reportedly fooled NCAA drug testers on
the eve of the 1988 Rose Bowl game by using someone else's urine carried in a plastic
bag taped inside their armpits and attached to a tube that came out between their
legs. See Michigan St. Officials to Look Into Alleged Steroid Use, supra note 133.
141. See Hair Sample Testing, 5 Individual Empl. Rights (BNA) No. 17, at 4 (Sept.
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Moving to the NCAA's alleged "compelling needs" for
testing, the court in Hill found that the NCAA's original
program did not achieve its goal of protecting the student-
athletes' health and safety and may actually have harmed
their health because the program banned the use of many
substances contained in over-the-counter and prescription
medications. 142  That objection does not apply to the new
program because it bans only the use of anabolic steroids,
which have well-documented health risks.'4 3 Hypertension,
cancer, sterility, liver trouble, and kidney and skin disorders
are among the side effects that have been tied to their
use.1
44
The Hill court also found that the original program did not
further its fairness-of-competition goal because the NCAA had
not established the performance-enhancing effects of any of
the banned substances.'45 The court of appeal relied on the
trial court's finding that "the possible performance enhance-
ment of steroids (increase in lean body mass and muscle
strength) was a scientific controversy which would not be
resolved in the foreseeable future." 46
Medical opinion, however, is tilting toward the conclusion
that anabolic steroids have performance-enhancing effects,
47
and the NCAA should be able to demonstrate those effects in
the near future if it cannot do so already. In 1984, Herbert
Haupt and G.D. Rovere performed a thorough and comprehen-
sive review of the literature on the effect of anabolic steroids
on athletic performance. 14 After reviewing twenty-five well-
documented studies, they concluded that consistent improve-
ments in strength will result from anabolic-steroid use when
25, 1990).
142. See Hill, 223 Cal. App. 3d at 1668, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 418.
143. See B. GOLDMAN, DEATH IN THE LOCKER ROOM: STEROIDS AND SPORTS (1984);
J. HARRIS, DRUGGED ATHLETES: CRISIS IN AMERICAN SPORTS (1987); J. MOHUM,
DRUGS, STEROIDS AND SPORTS (1988); W. TAYLOR, ANABOLIC STEROIDS AND THE ATH-
LETE (1982); J. WRIGHT, ANABOLIC STEROIDS AND SPORTS (1982); Crawshaw, The
Young Athlete: Recognizing Anabolic Steroid Use, PATIENT CARE, Aug. 1985, at 28;
Fuller & LaFountain, Performance-Enhancing Drugs in Sport: A Different Form of
Drug Abuse, 22 ADOLESCENCE 969 (1987); Haupt & Rovere, Anabolic Steroids: A
Review of the Literature, 12 AM. J. SPORTS MED. 469 (1984); Wilson & Griffin, The
Use and Misuse of Androgens, 29 METABOLISM 1278 (1980).
144. See Neff, supra note 12, at 21.
145. Hill, 223 Cal. App. 3d at 1669-73, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 418-21.
146. Id. at 1669, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 419.
147. See Altman, New "Breakfast of Champions": A Recipe for Victory or Disaster?,
N.Y. Times, Nov. 20, 1988, at Al, col. 4.
148. Haupt & Rovere, supra note 143.
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it is accompanied by high-intensity weight training and a
high-protein, high-calorie diet.'49 Haupt and Rovere also
found that steroids give the athlete a feeling of well-being and
diminished fatigue.' 0
The Hill court pointed to testimony that "no one had
scientifically demonstrated that any possible improvements in
strength would translate into enhanced performance for
football players. ""'1 Scientific evidence of that proposition
hardly seems necessary; I believe that any football coach
would testify that an increase in strength and muscle bulk
would prove a competitive advantage in football.
C. The Availability of Less-Offensive Alternatives
The third prong of the Hill test could prove to be the
biggest obstacle to the proposed program. The California
Court of Appeal observed:
The NCAA has not adequately considered and used testing
based on reasonable suspicion as an alternative to random
testing or testing based on playing time ....
For example, anabolic steroids . . . produce very
specific characteristics when taken. It is undisputed
that persons using anabolic steroids experience rapid
weight gain, a garlicky odor, hair loss, an increase in
aggressiveness, et cetera. This means that trainers and
coaches (who are extremely attentive to their players)
can, by closely observing their athletes, form a reason-
able suspicion of steroid use.'52
Along similar lines, Notre Dame football coach Lou Holtz has
stated: "If you're observant, you often can recognize an
individual using steroids. You may see a sudden gain. When
you see someone come out of nowhere to bench press 550
pounds, you have to wonder."'53
149. Id. at 474.
150. Id. at 475.
151. Hill, 223 Cal. App. 3d at 1670, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 419.
152. Id. at 1674, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 421.
153. L. HOLTz, THE FIGHTING SPIRIT: A CHAMPIONSHIP SEASON AT NOTRE DAME
161 (1989).
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NCAA officials, however, are not in a position to make
those observations, and it might be unrealistic to rely on
coaches and trainers to report steroid use by their own play-
ers. 54 Nevertheless, this should not present an insurmount-
able obstacle. A court should require the NCAA to limit its
program to reasonable-suspicion testing of athletes who show
characteristic signs of anabolic-steroid use.
VI. CONCLUSION
The NCAA's current drug-testing program is extremely
vulnerable to challenge under state constitutional rights of
privacy enforceable against private entities. Because the
NCAA's goal of fair competition makes it essential that its
drug-testing program meet the requirements of all state
constitutions, it must eliminate its original program of testing
student-athletes who participate in football bowl games and
NCAA championships for a wide range of banned substances.
If the NCAA decides to continue testing, a limited program of
unannounced, year-round testing of football players for
anabolic steroids might be the only type of program that would
withstand state constitutional scrutiny.
154. See Note, supra note 94, at 288 (discussing the role of coaches).
